Complex non-linear interactions between banks and assets we model by two time-dependent Erdős Renyi network models where each node, representing bank, can invest either to a single asset (model I) or multiple assets (model II). We use dynamical network approach to evaluate the collective financial failure-systemic risk-quantified by the fraction of active nodes. The systemic risk can be calculated over any future time period, divided on sub-periods, where within each sub-period banks may contiguously fail due to links to either (i) assets or (ii) other banks, controlled by two parameters, probability of internal failure p and threshold T h ("solvency" parameter). The systemic risk non-linearly increases with p and decreases with average network degree faster when all assets are equally distributed across banks than if assets are randomly distributed. The more inactive banks each bank can endure (smaller T h ), the smaller the systemic risk-for some T h values in I we report a discontinuity in systemic risk. When contiguous spreading becomes stochastic (ii) controlled by probability p2-a condition for the bank to be solvent (active) is stochastic-with increasing p2, the systemic risk decreases with both p and T h . We analyse asset allocation for the U.S. banks.
INTRODUCTION
Phase transitions, critical points, hystereses and regime shifts are basic blocks describing the phase flipping of a complex dynamical system between two or more phases [1] . One of the systems having these properties is the financial system that can be considered as a system flipping over time between mainly stable phase, representing good years, and mainly instable phase, representing bad years. In the financial system, the transition from mainly stable to mainly instable phase can be triggered either by an outside sudden event such as a war or by a bankruptcy of a huge bank where the financial contagion can spread due to interlinks between financial units. The nature of this contagion spreading implies that a network approach can be the best suitable framework to describe not only financial contagion but also financial crises [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . In networks, just like in financial systems, the existing nodes can be rewired, and new links and nodes can be added and removed as time elapses and node's properties can change over time [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] .
In seminal work on network approach in finance, Allen and Gale [3] argued that a more interelated network may help that the losses of a disstressed bank are shared among more creditors reducing the impact of negative * Electronic address: bp@phy.hr shocks to each individual bank. Using a network model of epodemics where nework is characterized by its degree distribution, Gai and Kapadia [9] showed that a large rare shock may have different consequences depending on where it hits in the network and what is the average connectivity of the network. In contrast, beyond a certain point, such interconnections may serve as a mechanism for propagation of large shocks leading to a more fragile financial system. Beale et al [10] focused on vulnerability of financial system, precisely on the friction of interest between individual banks and entire economy. The authors investigated the relationship between the risk taken by individual banks and the systemic risk associate with multiple bank failures. Arinaminpathy, Kapadia and May [11] reported how imposing tougher capital requirements on larger banks than smaller ones can increase the resilience of the financial system. Elliot, Golob, and Jackson [15] reported how integration (each organization becoming more dependent on its counterparties) and diversifications (each organization interacting with a larger number of counterparties) have different effects on cascading failure. Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi [13] reported that financial contagion exhibits a phase transition as interbank connectivity increases. If shocks are smaller than some threshold, more linked network enhance the stability of the system. However, for shocks larger than the threshold, more linked network facilitate financial contagion.
RESULTS
The global financial crisis has urged the need for analysing systemic risk representing the collective financial failure [1, 4, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 15] . The majority of literature on systemic risk is focused on how the financial system responds to the failure of a single bank. However, in real finance many banks can fail inherently either simultaneusly or at different moments. Here, in order to estimate the collective financial failure when multiple initial failures are possible occuring presumably at various moments, we model complex non-linear interaction between banks and firms by two variants of the dynamical Erdős Renyi network proposed in Ref. [23] , where nodes (banks) contiguously fail due to links to both (i) assets and (ii) other banks, and (iii) possibly recover. In Ref. [23] , the collective phenomena reported in a financial system-phase transitions, critical points, hystereses and phase flipping-have been described by the dynamical network approach. It has been explained how the network, due to (ii) stochastic contiguous spread among the nodes, may lead to the spontaneous emergence of macroscopic phase-flipping phenomena. In our dynamical network approach, bank i can internally fail at any moment t i , and once it fails, the contagion spreads at t i+1 on i's first neighbours, at t i+2 on i's second neighbours, and so on. This approach allows us to calculate the systemic risk at different future time horizons. The probability parameter controlling the macroscopic phaseflipping phenomena [23] determines also that the condition for a bank to be solvent (active) is not deterministic [9] , but stochastic.
Qualitatively it is known that more links between banks may reduce the risk of contagion [3] . Recently a model of contagion in financial networks has been proposed [9] where each bank i has interbank assets A 
where φ is the fraction of inactive neighbouring banks-a bank's assets must ecxeed its liabilities. To account for possibility that many banks can fail at any moment-not only at initial moment-and to account for possibility to estimating bank risk for different future time horizons, highly volatile financial networks in this work are modelled by dynamic Erdős Renyi networks I [23] . Applying this network in finance and relating to the model of Ref. [9] , in I nodes represent banks, and bank i at time
The previous time-dependent condition can be accomplished if (i) bank i internally fails randomly and independently of other nodes with probability of failure p-for each bank i, with probability p, A M t,i − D t,i becomes negative and i fails, regardless of interbank assets.
Besides internally, in I bank i can also fail (ii) with probability p 2 if it has less than 100T h % active neighbours (where i sets its interbank assets) [23, 24] . If not stated differently, here we assume that p 2 = 1, implying that if bank i has < 100T h % active banks, it deterministically fails. The parameter T h measures the robustness of bank network-the smaller the parameter T h , the more robust the bank network. Note that T h can be related with the criterion for bank failures of Ref. [9] . To this end, let's assume that for each bank there is a linear dependence between asset A Thus, 1 − T h = φ h . In I after a time period τ , the nodes recover from internal failure. In finance, this τ is comparable with an average time a firm spends in financial distress that is approximately two years for U.S. firms [25] .
To calculate how the systemic risk-among many different definitions [14] , here defined as the fraction of failed banks-depends on the model parameters, first we present an analytical result that holds for meanfield approximation, which is generally valid for a network with large number of nodes and degrees. If internal (X) and external (Y ) failures are independent, Ref. [23] calculated the probability, a = 1 − f n . Here P (k) is the degree distribution of the inter-bank links, and parameters p, T h , and p 2 are explained in
is the probability that node i's neighbourhood is critically damaged [23] , where k is the number of links of node i, and m ≡ T h k. For m = 1 we provide an analytical form of
. Applying analytical results in finance-where generally there are either small or moderately large number of banks-is limited since for these cases mean field holds only approximately [23] . For these cases, in practice, numerical approach helps us estimate how the systemic risk quantitatively depends on each model parameters and finally enable us to, using regression, estimate what the systemic risk is for a given set of empirically estimated parameters.
For dynamical Erdős Renyi network I with 1,000 banks, in numerical simulations each of 10,000 runs is used to estimate e.g. the systemic risk a year ahead expressed as the fraction of failed banks, 1 − f n . Each run we accomplish in two time steps and each bank can internally fail in both time steps with no recovery (τ > 2). By fixing parameters k and T h , in Fig. (1)(a)-(b) we find that the bank systemic risk, 1 − f n , increases nonlinearly with individual bank failure p. In Fig. (1)(a) the systemic risk decreases with the average degree k . Thus, the larger the number of links between banks, the smaller the systemic risk. This result is in agreement with Ref. [2] where it was shown that networks with more links are less vulnerable since the fraction of the losses in one bank is transferred to more banks through interbank links. Note that our choice k = 15 is due to Ref. [5] reporting that the average bank in the U.S. was linked to 15 others, however most banks has only few connections while a small number of huge banks have thousands.
In Fig. (1)(b) we report that the more failed neighbouring banks any bank can endure (the smaller T h ), the smaller the systemic risk. In economics, the existence of threshold assumes that when an organization's value (say asset minus debt) hits a failure threshold, the organization discontinuosly can lose part of its value [15] . Due to interdependencies among nodes, individual failues may trigger collective cascade of failures. To this end, with increasing T h the systemic risk in Fig. (1)(c) exhibits a non-linear discontinuity where 1 − f n suddenly jumps at some critical points in T h such as 1/2, 2/3, ..., since link values are integer numbers. Note that Ref. [23] reported a discontinuity in the fraction of active nodes, f n , when increasing (decreasing) p and p 2 , together with the hysteresis property that is the characteristic feature of a first-order phase transition [23, 24] . As stated in Introduction, recently Ref. [13] reported phase transition as interbank links increases. Fig. (1)(d) confirms again that the systemic risk decreases with k .
For many parameter sets ( k , T h , p, 1 − f n ) obtained from each two-period runs (where τ = 2, thus no recovery), one can perform linear regression analysis 1 − f n = α + α p p + α T T h + α k k, and obtain α = −0.016± 0.001, α p = 2.2 ± 0.033, α T = 0.067 ± 0.005, and α k = −0.0017 ± 0.0002. The systemic risk significantly increases with p and T h , while decreases with degree k . Note that these values we obtained using p ∈ (0, 0.1), T h ∈ (0.2, 0.8), and k ∈ (2, 20).
Dynamical network approach reveals one more forecasting benefit. It provides us with forecasting power for generally any future time horizon. For the dynamical Erdős Renyi network I in Fig. (1)(b) we show the expected systemic risk when T h = 0.7 where each of 10,000 runs is composed of four steps. If each time step represents, say semi-year period, than two-step systemic risk represents our estimation for systemic risk a year ahead, while four-step systemic risk represents our estimation for systemic risk two years ahead. As expected for the case with no recovery, four-step systemic risk is larger than two-step systemic risk. Similar result we obtain in Fig. (1)(c) where for k = 8 we show that four-step systemic risk is substantially larger than two-step systemic risk. Note that these results we obtain under assumption that banks and assets, once failed, do not recover. Clearly, in more reliable dynamical network approach one should also define how assets and banks recover over time after, for example, the government intervenes in the market. Fig. (2) shows that with increasing parameter p 2 -decreasing p 2 from 1 to 0.6-the systemic risk decreases with both p and T h , that is a reasonable result since p 2 = 1 implies that a bank deteministicly fails when a criterion for insolvency (1 − φ t,i )A that really occurs in real market, since bankruptcy is not deterministic event. However, stochasticity is not important only at microscopic firm (bank) level. Ref. [23] reported that introduction of stochasticity leads to emergence of macroscopic phase-flipping between "active" and "inactive" macroscopic phases that are demonstrated in Ref. [24] for "expansion" and "recession" phases in economy.
In the previous network I it was assumed that each bank can independently internally fail. Next we propose another network model II (see Methods), where each bank can put its money not only in other banks, as in I, but also in different illiquid asset classes A M i , where different banks can invest in equal assets A M i , so banks' failures are not independent. In contrast to banks' failures, A M i failures are assumed to be independent to each other. For simplicity, we define that firms can affect banks, but not vice versa as in [9, 11, 26] .
In the following simulations we include recovery process. In II there are four time steps in our analysis, but this time we change the time period needed for recovery, τ . For (i)-(iii) ER dynamical network with finite number of banks, N b = 1000, and assets, N f = 10, our numerical simulations in Fig. (3)(a) confirm that the systemic risk calculated for bank network-defined by the fraction of banks in failure-increases with the individual probability of asset failure p, chosen to be equal for each asset. We assume as in Ref. [11] that both large and small banks hold the same number of asset classes, 10. We perform 10 5 simulations in order to estimate expected systemic risk where each simulation itself we perform in four steps with τ meaning that once a bank or an asset is failed, it stays failed for the entire period τ . In all simulations of Figs. (1) , for simplicity we set p 2 = 1, implying again that if bank j's neighborhood is critically damaged, it deterministically fails. Figs. (3) reveals that this dynamical network II exhibits highly non-linear properties. By first fixing parameter T h , in Fig. (3)(a) for II we find that the systemic risk for bank network increases with τ . The longer time a bank stays in failure, the larger systemic risk. In Fig. (3)(b) we show how dynamical approach enables us to estimate systemic risk for different time scales. As expected, with increasing the time horizon, the systemic risk also increases. In Fig. (2)(b) we further find that the more failure neighbouring banks any bank can endure (the smaller T h ), the smaller the systemic risk-this result is also confirmed in Fig. (2)(c) where we find that the larger is the number of links between banks, the smaller is the systemic risk for a given T h . Note that T h = 0 assumes the case when banks do not affect each other as assumed in Ref. [10] . In agreement with Fig. (2)(c) , in Fig. (2)(d) we find that the systemic risk decreases with k .
In order to analyse how banks and assets interact with each other over time, we evolve simultaneously both banks and assets. In Fig. (4) we show how the fractions of failed (N f = 10) assets and (N f = 1000) banks change over time for a given set of parameters, where recovery exists. Note how the periods when many assets are dysfunctional coincide with the periods when many banks are dysfunctional, in agreement with our model assumption that asset failures may affect bank failures in all banks having investments in the failed assets.
Our network model II is partially motivated by Beale et al [10] . As known in finance, each bank can reduce its probability of failure by diversifying its risk [27] . However, when many banks diversify their risks in similar way, the probability of multiple failure increases [10] . For the case with N banks and M assets, [10] defined the total loss incurred by bank i after one period Y i = W ij V j , where the failure occurs if its total losses exceed a given threshold γ i , i.e. Y i > γ i . Here, W ij denotes bank i ′ s allocation in asset j, V j is the loss in asset j's value taken from a student t distribution, and γ i is a threshold. In Fig. 2 , we replaced t distribution by a simpler Laplace distribution (see II) and derive a probability of bank failure with two assets with allocations W 1 and W 2 :
This expression, numerically tested in Fig. (5) , gives the same smile-form for the probability of bank failure as numerically found in Ref. [10] . Next we analyse how diversification of asset allocations affects systemic risk within dynamical network approach. To this end, Ref. [10] proposed a measure to estimate the level of asset allocation
in order to quantify the average of the distances between each pair of banks' asset allocations, where D = 0 if each bank invests equally in each asset, thus if W i,j = 1/M for each i and j. Thus, when many banks decide to invest with similar portfolios, they may increase the chance to fail simultaneously. In Fig. (6) (a) within network approach, we obtain that the lowest systemic risk occurs when all assets are equally distributed across banks, that is in agreement with the result obtained in Ref. [10] where banks do not affect each other, and systemic risk is defined as expected number of failures. With increasing randomness in asset allocation, where D increases from zero to 1/3, the systemic risk also increases. As a new result arising from the network approach, in Fig. (6)(b) we obtain that the systemic risk decreases with average degree k faster when asset allocation is more homogeneous. To see how well the real market can withstand systemic risk, we exam the level of diversification of asset 
